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“Now for an unusual suggestion. It might be a good idea for the reader to stop reading 
this paper at the end of this section (but do, please, return and finish it), mull over the 
problem for a while (several hours, days) and then return. It is not that I claim to solve 
the problem, and do not want you to miss the joy of puzzling over an unsolved 
problem
1. It is that I want you to understand my thrashing about.” 
Nozick (1970), p. 117  
 
                                                           
Without intending to help me out with a conclusion that is reasonable from the point of view 
of the poor mortal Player, pitted against a Demon, my critical friend Alfredo Pastor – a 
personification of reasonable man – provided a reaction which, in fact, seemed obvious. He 
is, of course, not responsible for my interpretation of his reasonable reaction to an earlier, 
somewhat deliberately incomplete, version of this paper. 
 
1 The way I have reformulated the problem, it can be made into an ‘unsolvable problem’, in 









A re-interpretation of the asymmetric roles assigned to the two agents in the genesis 
of Newcomb’s Paradox is suggested. The re-interpretation assigns a more active role 
for the ‘rational’ agent and a possible Turing Machine interpretation for the behaviour 
of the demon (alias ‘being from another planet, with an advanced technology and 
science,..,etc.’).  These  modifications,  while  introducing  new  conundrums  to  an 
already  diabolical  interaction,  do  allow  the  ‘rational’  agent,  as  a  computably 
behavioural agent, to make a clear decision, if any decision is possible at all. This 
latter caveat is necessary because in the Turing Machine formulation, the computably 














§1. A Brief Preamble 
 
William Newcomb devised the Newcomb Paradox in 1960, but it was left to Robert Nozick 
(1970) to revive it in the context of choice theory and make it one of the staples of the 
conundrums  facing  the  decision  theorist,  almost  in  the  class  of  the  more  famous  Allais, 
Ellsberg and other similar paradoxes. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, most – if not all – of the proposed ‘solutions’ have left the 
‘Being’ – who will be referred to as Newcomb’s Demon 
3 in this note – unscathed
4. All of the 
difficulties of extricating oneself from the Demon’s wiles and flawless predictive powers are 
placed squarely in the court of the ‘player’ – clearly an ordinary ‘mortal’. 
 
I want to suggest a mode of viewing the paradox which could, instead, leave Newcomb’s 
Demon in a dilemma of a Gödelian type. This enables the player, at last, to exercise a plain 
and simple kind of behaviour and walk off with $1000! 
 
§2. The Paradox 
Suppose you are playing a ‘game’ with Newcomb’s Demon, who has powerful predictive 
powers.  More precisely (Nozick, op.cit,p. 114): 
“You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and 
has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and 
furthermore  you know that this being has  often correctly predicted the choices of 
other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation [of this 
paradox]. One might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost 
certainly this being’s prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will 
be correct.” 
                                                           
3 In the noble tradition of Maxwell’s Demon, Laplace’s Demon and Hilbert’s Demon in post-
Newtonian scientific thought experiments – and not unrelated to the Walrasian Auctioneer in 
economics, who was so named in an unfortunately misunderstood analogy with Maxwell’s 
Demon by Axel Leijonhufvud. 
4 The reference list, below, collects a few of the more famous contributions towards a 




I am afraid the statement of the problem is somewhat imprecise – perhaps that was Nozick’s 
intention, from the outset. ‘Often’, ‘so far as you know’, ‘many’ and ‘almost certain’
5 remain 
open to interpretation in the particular formal system in which one may choose to resolve the 
paradox. For example, it is possible to interpret the first criterion – ‘often correctly predicted 
your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction 
about your choices)’ – as the behaviour of a Demon who only predicts when he knows for 
certain that it will be correct. This will call into question the meaning of ‘knows’ – but let that 
pass. 
 
This particular behaviour by the Demon is entirely interpretable – without any probabilistic 
underpinning – as that by a Turing Machine (or any of its equivalents by the Church-Turing 
Thesis) facing recursively enumerable sets that are not recursive, in conjunction with the 
theorem of the Halting Problem for Turing Machines.  
 
Before expanding on such an interpretation, let me summarise the paradox. There are two 
boxes in front of you: one is opaque; the other is transparent and you can plainly see an 
authentic $1000 note placed in it. 
 
However, you know that Newcomb’s Demon has placed $1,000,000 or nothing in the opaque 
box – depending on what the Demon has predicted YOU will do, when your turn comes to 
choose one of two courses of actions: 
1.  You can either take the opaque box  
2.  Or you can take both boxes. 
 
The Demon, too, seems to act in one of two possible ways: 
I.  It places nothing in the opaque box if it predicts you will choose both boxes. 
II.  It places 1,000,000 in the opaque box if it predicts YOU would choose to take just the 
opaque box. 
 
                                                           
5 That this notion is, possibly, probabilistically grounded is evident from the discussion on p. 
115 and p.131 and the related footnote 16 on p. 145. But it is not clear from the context what 
kind of probability is being used; indeed, it is not clear to me that Nozick does not freely 
switch from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective’ notions of probability quite arbitrarily.   
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Which course of action will you choose? 
 
Here is a somewhat exaggerated graphic display of the problem:  
 
A  possible  payoff  matrix  for  a  ‘rational  choice  theoretic’  interpretation  of  YOU  vs.  the 
Demon is as follows: 
 
  Demon predicts P1  Demon Predicts P2 
Action A1 by YOU  $1,000,000  $0 





P1: The Demon predicts you will take only the opaque box. 
P2 : The Demon predicts you will take both boxes. 
A1: YOU take only the opaque box. 
A2: YOU take both boxes. 
 
Nozick  devised  this  variant  of  the  Newcomb  Demon  problem  to  highlight  the  conflict 
between relying on the principle of maximizing subjective expected utility (SEU), and the 
dominance principle. Illuminating discussions and possible resolutions of the paradox can be 
found in Bar-Hillel & Margalit (1972), Gardner (1973), Horgan (1981) and Levi (1982).  
 
§3. A Brief Recursion Theoretic Note 
Two  important  implicit  assumptions  in  any  formal  consi deration  of  a  resolution  of 
Newcomb’s Paradox need to be made explicit before any reasonable solution can even be 
considered meaningful: honesty to one’s own thought processes, which I shall refer to as the 
Self-Honesty-Postulate (SHP), and time.  
 
Suppose Newcomb’s Demon, or YOU – or both – are actually, Turing Machines (perhaps in 
disguise).  Essentially  this  should  be  analysed  as  an  Alternating  Arithmetic  Game  (cf. 
Velupillai, 2000, chapter 7). Such games may be able to determine the winner in such two 
person complete information games, but will not provide a method – an algorithm – for the 
determined winner to implement to ‘win’.  
 
But the alternation is in the sphere of thought processes and would require the application of 




What does it mean for a Turing Machine to be honest to its own thought processes  – or even 
for YOU to be honest to YOUR own thought processes, supposing YOU are not a Turing 
                                                           
6 As in the description of the choice YOU make between two actions, Nozick (pp. 114-5): 
“[Y]ou know [that you] have choice between two actions.   Furthermore, .. you know 
this, the being knows that you know this, and so on.”  
7 
 
Machine?  The  simple  answer  to  the  former  alternative  will  be  analogous  to  the  kind  of 
postulates  underpinning a computing machine that  has  to  process  a true sentence that it 
cannot print, given that the sentences it prints are all true (cf. Smullyan, 1972, pp. 2-4). 
 
§4. The Demon’s Dilemma 
Suppose we look at the paradox from the point of view of the Demon, rather than as one in 
which the rational agent must resolve a choice theoretic dilemma.  
 
The demon is said to examine YOU, for its predictive purposes. What does it mean to state 
that the demon examines YOU, for its predictive purposes? One possible thought experiment 
of the demon’s ‘examination process’ is to suppose that it lists all YOUR feasible thought 
processes, stated formally as – say – well-formed-formulas(WFF) in a well-defined alphabet. 
These  can  be  number-theoretically  encoded  effectively,  for  example  using  the  usual 
technique of Gödel numbering. 
 
Let us continue to suppose the demon is a computing machine
7, essentially a Turing Machine, 
that considers only the feasible thought processes, stated as WFFs. The demon’s ‘infallible 
predictive record’ could be interpreted to mean that it will only act on the basis of processing 
one of the possible Gödel numbers, for its predictive purposes. 
 
Can YOU induce the demon, through YOUR thought processes, into paralysis? One possible 
way YOU can do this is to include the following thought in your set of WFFs: 
I predict that the demon will place $1,000,000 in the opaque box if, and only if, it 
thinks, you think, it will not place it in it. 
 
Call this SHP (for the Self-Honesty-Postulate).  
 
Now suppose the list of your thought processes form a recursively enumerable set that is not 
recursive. What does the demon do, under the constraint of having to respect SHP and having 
to check, as a Turing Machine, a list forming a recursively enumerable set that is not 
recursive ? Now, add the further supposition that the Demon, in its Turing Machine 
                                                           
7 If, in the theory of evolution, replication is occasionally ‘explained’ by invoking an analogy 
with a ‘slightly faulty copying machine’, I see no undue stretch of the imagination being 
called forth for an analogy that equates Newcomb’s Demon with a Turing Machine.  
8 
 
incarnation, has a time constraint imposed upon its decision process. Can the demon, as a 
Turing Machine, avoid getting into a non-halting state? 
 
More  sophisticated  versions  of  such  paralysis-inducing  thoughts  by  YOU  can  easily  be 
constructed, all of which will challenge an implicit hypothesis in the characterisation of an 
‘infallible’  demon:  that  the  demon  is  honest  to  its  thought  –  i.e.,  to  itself  –  and  a  time 
constraint.  
 
In the original version of the paradox, as re-interpreted by Nozick, it is assumed that the 
demon’s action precedes the choice by the rational agent
8; but also that the demon’s actions 
are  informed  by  its  own  thought  processes.  These  latter,  in  turn,  are  induced  by  an 
‘inspection’ of YOUR thought processes. 
 
Therefore, now YOU have the possibility of manipulating YOUR thought processes with the 
intention of paralysing the demon’s action. 
 
In the face of the Demon’s possible paralysis, YOU simply take both boxes and walk away 
with a smug smile on your face! 
 
§4. Brief Concluding Discussion 
I  conjecture  that  the  most  fruitful  way  to  resolve  Newcomb’s  paradox  is  to  remove  the 
asymmetry between the rational agent and the demon and endow the latter, too, with self-
inflicted, paradox-inducing, capabilities of (algorithmic) rationality. This will, of course, lead 
to a new kind of indeterminacy, which is best understood in terms of machine models of 
thought and action. 
 
In  fact,  I  go  further  and  claim  that  the  Newcomb  Paradox  can  be  interpreted  most 
illuminatingly also as a version of the ‘Gödelian Puzzle’ in Smullyan (1992), pp. 2-3. There 
                                                           
8 As described by Nozick (ibid, p. 115; italics added): 
“The situation is as follows: First, the being makes its predictions. Then it puts the [$1 
000 000] in the second box, or does not, depending upon what it has predicted. Then 
you make your choice.”   
9 
 
are  many  variants  of  such  puzzles,  all  of  them  resulting  in  one  or  another  kind  of 
undecidability or unsolvability. 
 
Again, as suggested above, it may be most useful to view Newcomb’s paradox dynamically, 
as an alternating Turing machine game, where the question of the resolution of the paradox is 
posed as one of effective playability. Alternatively, my conjecture is that the paradox could be 
transformed into a Diophantine decision problem. 
 
I  cannot  but  imagine  that  the  resolution,  in  the  former  case,  will  be,  appealing  to  some 
version of the undecidability of the Halting problem for Turing machines, that the game has 
no effective procedural solution. In the latter case, using the negative answer to Hilbert’s 
Tenth Problem, an alternative form of an algorithmic undecidability could be derived. 
 
In any case, the problem is one that is inherently dynamic and the time element has never 
been considered in any of the several resolutions of the paradox that have been proposed till 
now. Surely, the demon should be freed from the possibility of entering a state of paralysis by 
being  given  a  time  constraint  for  its  action?  YOU  can,  however,  still  induce  a  Turing 
Machine demon to enter into a non-halting state, which will be the Machine equivalent of 
entering a state of paralysis  with  respect  to  action  – and YOU can know that  you have 
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